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14 How does path dependence affect 
the climate change-conf l ict  
nexus? 
Jasmin S. A. Link 
A b s t r a c t  
In sociology, path dependence can be defined as a self-reinforcing process with the 
tendency towards a lock-in. This concept can be applied to the climate-conflict 
nexus to assess how path dependence, this particular characteristic of a process, 
affects the complex potential causalities of climate-induced conflict. Does path de-
pendence enhance the conflict potential through butterfly effects or does it rather 
pacify by increasing conformity? The nature of climate change-induced conflict is 
analyzed with an integrative framework that is based on a review of peer-re-
viewed related case studies. Using the methodology of mathematical sociology, a 
complex causal chain is drawn to reflect the influence of path dependence in the 
situation of climate change-induced conflict. Sociological conflict theories are used 
to depict, in which way and to what extent path dependence may or may not in-
fluence the societal reaction to climate change. 
KEYWORDS: path dependence, climate change, conflict, sociology, feedback loops. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Can path dependence or climate change induce violent conflict? This is the title of my 
cumulative dissertation, which combines new developments in path dependence 
theory with research on the climate change-conflict nexus. A key issue is how path 
dependence affects the climate change-conflict nexus. 
Climate change in IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to 
natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, where climate change refers to a change of 
climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composi-
tion of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability ob-
served over comparable time periods (Parry et al. 2007, p. 6). 
From a sociological perspective, the role of humans is more important than the mere 
climatic changes as “natural scientists have recognized that climate change is a “peo-
ple problem”: it is caused by human behaviors, it poses real threats to humans, and 
it requires collective action for its amelioration” (Dunlap and Brulle 2015). An indirect 
consequence of climate change, which is a threat to humans, can be conflict. Even 
though conflict is usually something very active, in the discussion of climate change-
induced conflict, conflict gets a passive connotation. 
Conflict is a main term in sociology and is used in various contexts. However, 
the induction of conflict by anything else than social agents is only rarely reflected. 
In the empirical literature on the climate change-conflict nexus, which tries to assess 
whether or not there is a linkage between climate change and conflict, usually the 
definition of conflict is drawn from the data used. For example, there are data on 
conflict within a state or among states differing on whether or not the government 
is involved [state as an actor] and that vary with regard to the defined minimum 
number of casualties in a specific time span and region to make it count aws violent 
conflict. Moreover, of course, only documented or observed conflicts are counted. 
The identification of “reasons” for conflict onset is even trickier. A statistical corre-
lation does not explain the underlying mechanisms. One main mechanism consid-
ered in the climate-conflict nexus is resource scarcity. Explained in terms of action 
theory, actors are expected to react in a conflictive manner when their resources get 
scarcer, as is potentially the case due to climate change. Such affected resources can 
be for example water availability due to changes in precipitation patterns or assets 
due to losses in extreme events. However, particularly for water, scarcity has often 
led to cooperation instead of violent conflict, which is documented in many interna-
tional water agreements. And sometimes even the opposite effect can be discovered: 
in parts of Kenia violent conflict is more present when more cattle are available and 
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in good shape for raiding during the rainy seasons (Schilling et al. 2012). Thus, the 
climate change-conflict nexus is complex (Figure 1). 
Path dependence is generally used in social sciences in a sense of “history matters” 
or “former events shape later ones” where the “path” is formed by a sequence of events 
and the order matters (for further reading on reactive sequences, e. g., Mahoney 
2000). For example, the invention of the steam engine (one event) has triggered the 
industrial revolution (next event), which has triggered climate change (subsequent 
event). In this example, the industrial revolution depends on the invention of the steam 
engine and climate change depends on the industrial revolution. Thus, climate change 
depends on the invention of the steam engine. However, if the steam engine had been 
invented without triggering any substantially large-scale applications during the in-





















































Figure 1:  Analytical framework of  l inkages between the climate system, natural 
re-sources, human security, and societal stability. Source: Scheffran 
et al.  2012a. 
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20th and 21st centuries and climate change would have been less intense or would not 
have occurred at all. Thus, each of the events matter as well as the logical order of the 
events. A more process-oriented view of path dependence considers self-reinforcing 
dynamics such as positive feedbacks and the occurrence of lock-ins such as tipping 
points. In this definition, which I use fundamentally throughout my work and also in 
this essay, a path-dependent process is defined as a self-reinforcing process with the 
tendency towards a lock-in (Sydow et al. 2005, 2009). 
By now, of course, there is substantial literature on climate change and violent 
conflict. Some of this research addresses whether or not a linkage exists in theoreti-
cal or meta-study reflections. Furthermore, there are case studies in various regions 
with diverse stakeholders and differing conflict intensity. However, none of these 
peer reviewed published studies reflects on the role of path dependence on the link-
age between climate change and conflict, how path dependence shapes the intensity 
of the outcome or the dynamics of the involved mechanisms (Link 2018). This issue 
is addressed in this essay. The research question is how climate change can induce a 
path-dependent process that self-reinforces conflict. To answer this research ques-
tion a mix of three methods is used: 
1. An analytical framework on climate change and conflict (Figure 1; Scheffran 
et al. 2012a); 
2. A comparative review of the peer reviewed scientific literature on the linkages 
between climate-related indicators and data on violent conflict using large-n 
designs, published between 2004 and 2012: “To come to conclusions about the 
effect of climate change on violent conflict with validity beyond single cases, 
we limit the analysis to (quantitative) empirical studies using regression anal-
ysis based on conflict and climate data because of their increasing importance 
in the recent debate and the difficulties associated with the comparison of 
(qualitative) field-research studies. We analyze the results of recent relevant 
studies, classifying them with the help of a number of criteria such as speci-
fied climate-conflict link, conflict type, region, analyzed period […] and data 
used to carve out differences and similarities. We limit the analysis to studies 
published since 2004 and accept their academic credibility as articles pub-
lished in peer-reviewed scientific journals” (Scheffran et al. 2012b); 
3. Theoretical deductions about potentially induced dynamics based on the re-
sults of the above methods and path dependence theory, especially self-re-
inforcing processes. 
Within the analytical framework (first method), I note the potential mechanisms ex-
tracted from the empirical literature (second method). Then I describe in further the-
oretical deductions (third method), how these mechanisms can be triggered by climate 
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change and in particular, how they link conflict to climate change in a self-reinforcing 
spiral via increasing vulnerabilities. This is done using aggression theory and rational 
choice as conflict theory, which is basically resource conflict theory. 
This essay concludes with a short summary of the findings, including a short 
note about another application of path dependence theory on climate change-in-
duced conflict. 
H o w  c a n  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  i n d u c e  a  p a t h - d e p e n d e n t  
p r o c e s s  t h a t  s e lf - r e i nfo r c e s  c o nf l i c t ?  
The main conflict theories used in the climate-conflict nexus are resource conflict 
theories and aggression theory, as these are action-centered and related to natural 
resources and human security, which are both depicted in Figure 1. Resource con-
flicts can be triggered by altered resource distribution or changes in resource availa-
bility. Aggression theory incorporates the idea that conflicts may worsen or break 
out if people get more aggressive. This can potentially be the case if physical condi-
tions vary due to climate change. 
Human aggression can be defined as the violation of a norm, which implies cur-
rent or potential harm by a responsible person. The act of the violation can be means 
or end of action but without any arguments or excuses (following Mees 1990, p. 286). 
The classical frustration-aggression-theory tries to include the reason for human ag-
gression before the act, an inner frustration. An environmental component, which 
is necessary to be able to reflect on climate change-induced conflict, is empirically 
studied by Berkowitz: 
Take high temperatures as a case in point. Have you ever found yourself in a very hot 
room that you couldn’t leave for several hours, for one reason or another? If you’re like 
many other persons, according to a growing body of research, there’s a good chance that 
you became irritable and perhaps even openly hostile (Berkowitz 1993, p. 51). 
Berkowitz’ neoassociationistic aggression model is a revision and development of 
the classical frustration-aggression-theory (Bonacker 2008). The model describes 
that automatically feelings of fear or anger arise in affected people. These feelings 
are then connected to “flight or fight”. Experiments have shown that the larger the 
changes in environmental conditions are (room temperature during the experi-
ments) and the worse the considered person is feeling, the lower the threshold to ac-
tually perform aggression and violence on others becomes. In the experiments, the 
presence of weapons has significantly increased the likelihood of the considered peo-
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ple to interpret their own feelings as anger, which increases the likelihood to act ag-
gressively (Berkowitz 1993, p. 72ff.). Thus, existing conflicts can increase the likeli-
hood of further aggression even if this aggression is not directly related to the exist-
ing conflict constellation. Aggressive behavior can induce further conflicts and en-
hance existing ones. The inclusion of the environmental component makes it appli-
cable in the context of potential climate change-induced conflicts. 
In climate-conflict research, the conflict theoretical basis is often not clearly de-
fined. In my research, I base resource conflicts on rational choice theory. Rational 
choice theory is a very large field of sociology at the intersection to economics seek-
ing to explain every potential social behavior as the outcome of individual interac-
tion, which is supposed to be basically rational (Coleman 1990; Esser 1993). One fun-
damental model is RREEMM: 
Resourceful: man can search for and find possibilities; he can learn and be inventive; 
Restricted: man is confronted with scarcity and must substitute (choose); 
Expecting: man attaches subjective probabilities to (future) events; 
Evaluating: man has ordered preferences and evaluates (future) events; 
Maximizing: man maximizes (expected) utility when choosing a course of action; 
Man (Lindenberg 1985). 
RREEMM is a sociological development of the homo oeconomicus who is a special 
case of RREEMM. Within this model thinking, actors can be considered to their sub-
jective expected utility (SEU) on the micro level and play pairwise prisoner’s dilem-
mas. Even though both would be better off in performing cooperative behavior, each 
individual is better off defecting and thus the Nash-equilibrium is the situation of 
both defecting, i. e. the situation of conflict (Bonacker 2008). Rational choice theory 
and the SEU can be applied to explain arms races and resource conflicts (Scheffran 
1989, 2008; Scheffran and Hannon 2007), too. In the further deductions, these theo-
ries are used as broader background theories but they are not applied via utility func-
tions or game theory. The idea is to show the overall linked mechanisms and their 
interaction dynamics with regard to climate change and conflict. 
H o w  d o e s  p a t h  d e p e n d e n c e  af fe c t  t h e  c l i m a t e  
c h a n g e - c o n f l i c t  n e x u s ?  
Here, I start with the second method, the comparative literature review of research 
published between 2004 and 2012 that is presented by Scheffran and others (2012a) and 
further elaborated in a second paper (Scheffran et al. 2012b). There are large differ-
ences between regions and time periods, different types of conflict are addressed, and 
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even the variables that have been studied vary among the different cases. Still each of 
the papers analyzed states whether the authors have found a correlation of the ana-
lyzed variables, changes in precipitation, temperature changes, occurrence of disas-
ters, land degradation or changes in the vegetation, and conflict with or without in-
volvement of the state and using different data sets. Geographic foci range from Afri-
can regions, East Asia, or Europe to global analyses. While this variability points to no 
direct comparability, 16 of the 27 studies have found a link between the analyzed cli-
mate change variable and conflict. Most of these examined the relationship between 
precipitation change and possible conflict onset, other key drivers studied include 
temperature, disasters, and land use change (Scheffran et al. 2012b), with a focus on 
conflicts that involve state actors. In contrast, six explicitly stated that there was no link 
among their analyzed climate variable and conflict variables. That leaves five studies, 
which state that in their cases the linkage has been ambiguous, giving arguments both 
for and against a climate-conflict-link. These studies look at water resources and land 
use change as conflict drivers and point to increased conflict likelihood for substantial 
deviations of the drivers from current mean states. And even if long-term historical 
studies rather suggest a linkage and studies that are more recent rather do not: a mere 
statistical correlation does not reveal the underlying mechanisms of induction. 
Thus, searching for the underlying mechanisms of induction, the next focus is not 
only on the climate variables and potential conflict variables they induce but also on 
potential intermediate factors, taking into account that a potential induction is not 
necessarily direct. 
Since the 1990s, there has been an extensive scientific debate on how the scarcity of nat-
ural resources such as minerals, water, energy, fish, and land affects violence and armed 
conflict (Bächler 1999; Homer-Dixon 1994). While many case studies suggest that envi-
ronmental degradation and resource scarcity undermine human well-being, the effect 
on violent conflict “appears to be contingent on a set of intervening economic and politi-
cal factors that determine adaptation capacity” (Bernauer et al. 2012, p. 1). Particular at-
tention has been placed on the following intermediate factors (Scheffran and Battaglini 
2011; WBGU 2008) (Link 2018, p. 91f.). 
These intermediate factors can be summed up as: 
̶ precipitation change and variability, 
̶ freshwater resources and scarcity, 
̶ land and food, 
̶ weather extremes, 
̶ environmental migration. 
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Focusing on the region that is affected by climate change, environmental migration 
as outmigration is rather an adaptation measure and likely to reduce conflict in the 
originally affected regions. Whether or not weather extremes lead to local crises still 
needs to be studied because some cases of crisis have induced cooperation rather 
than conflict. The rest can be connected by causal chains such as precipitation 
change and variability can lead to impacts on the availability of freshwater resources 
and to impacts on land and food production. Associated conflicts that have been an-
alyzed are framed as potential resource conflicts, thus fitting with the theoretical ba-
sis of this deduction. For freshwater resources, rather induced cooperation is men-
tioned instead of conflicts due to the increasing number of international water 
agreements. 
Therefore, the extracted linkage of intermediate factors is that climate change 

















































potential cause or increase
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Figure 2:  Central intermediate factors in the analytical  framework (Figure 1). 
Note: M arked in red are t he potenti al feedb ac ks vi a v i olent con flic t and 
vulnerabilit y,  i nd uced by climat e chang e. 
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lead to impacts on land and food production. In the following, I describe in detail 
how I place this linkage in the context of the framework mentioned above (Figure 2). 
In the next step, I selected these intermediate factors, which are considered to 
play a crucial role in the process of induction of conflict by climate change from the 
components in the analytical framework of linkages between the climate system, 
natural resources, human security, and societal stability (Figure 1). 
In Figure [2], the final three intermediate factors and the conflict potentials have been 
sketched in the scheme of the complex analytical framework (Figure [1]). Afterwards, I 
have added the potential feedbacks that conflict can have on the vulnerabilities, i. e. the 
human vulnerability and the environmental vulnerability, via the conflict’s potential im-
pacts on the adaptive capacity and the sensitivity to climate change, referring to: Vulner-
ability can be broken down into three factors: (i) exposure to climate change, (ii) sensitiv-
ity to climate change, and (iii) adaptive capacity (Parry et al. 2007). The last two can be 
affected by conflict (Link 2018, p. 60). 
That way, conflict can increase environmental vulnerability, which increases the effect 
of changes in the climate system on the environmental system (Buhaug 2015). Along 
the causal chain, conflict can increase the impact of changes in the environmental sys-
tem on human security as well by increasing human vulnerability (Matthew 2015). The 
accumulated impacts can further lead to increased resource conflicts (Vivekananda et 
al. 2014). This causal deduction describes a feedback loop induced by climate change, 
in which conflict feeds back on increasing conflict and thus self-reinforces conflict 
(Link 2018). Does this self-reinforcing process of conflict approach a lock-in? That de-
pends on the kind of conflict. There are lock-ins possible for resource conflicts: on the 
one hand, a theoretically trivial lock-in would be reached if the conflicting parties de-
stroyed each other or if only one of them survived. Another lock-in could be reached if 
the conflict was institutionalized such as the conflict over land between Israel and Pal-
estine (Chapman and Benson 2015; Gerner 2018). In the first type of lock-in, the level 
of violent conflict escalates up to destruction while in the second type of lock-in, the 
conflict becomes an institution, which can be fought out on various levels without de-
stroying each other. Instead, it maintains the conflict even in times of lower levels of 
intensity of violence (Link 2018). 
Consequently, climate change can induce the path-dependent process of self-
reinforcing conflict. This matches the discussion of climate change being a threat 
multiplier of existing conflicts rather than causing them initially. But the application 
of aggression theory allows the description of one mechanism how climate change 
could induce conflict, i. e. if people react increasingly aggressively due to the feeling 
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of being affected by environmental change (Figure 2, arrow at the bottom directly 
from the climate system to the societal stability) (Link 2018). 
C o n c l u s i o n  
This essay describes my research in the context of the Research Group Climate Change 
and Security (CLISEC) and my dissertation (Link 2018) on the specific question how 
climate change can induce a path-dependent process that self-reinforces conflict. 
From empirical literature, potential mechanisms for climate change-induced conflict 
are extracted and connected in the analytical framework of the interacting climate sys-
tem, natural resources, human security, and societal stability. This framework is used 
to visualize how these extracted induction mechanisms can form a self-reinforcing 
process that reinforces conflict by stepwise increasing environmental and human vul-
nerability, which intensify the effects of climate change on the induction mechanisms. 
Based on aggression theory and the theory of resource conflicts during the described 
self-reinforcing process, climate change acts as a multiplier enhancing existing con-
flicts and increases the likelihood of triggering or spreading further conflicts. 
Current political developments such as global climate demonstrations reveal 
even more applications of path dependence theory on climate change induced con-
flict: In my dissertation, I have shown mathematical sociologically that the more an 
agent is affected by path dependence, the more that agent tends to perform a follow-
ing behavior. Considering opposing hierarchies such as climate change activists and 
climate change deniers, path dependence reinforces their opposition whenever an 
event triggers their path-dependent social network (Link 2018). That way, climate 
change can induce conflict among those opponents, which is reinforced via path de-
pendence. This is another example of how path dependence affects the climate 
change-conflict nexus, highlighting the necessity to more strongly appreciate the 
role path dependence plays in determining people’s actions. 
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